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Summary: 
This paper highlights the relevant role of the quality of institutions in maintaining 
banking stability. Poor institutions constitute the key determinants in explaining the 
emergence of banking crises. An empirical study of 52 emerging and / or developing 
countries from 1996 to 2009 finds that banking instability is widely associated with a variety 
of macroeconomic, financial and ,particularly, institutional factors. Our main conclusion 
stipulates that the strengthening of institutional quality is an essential condition to ensure 
banking stability. Political stability, voice and accountability, and respect for the rule and law 
are relevant institutional characteristics in particular.  
Keywords: quality of institutions, supervision and prudential regulation schemes, bank 
instability, Logit technique, emerging and / or developing countries. 
Introduction 
In recent decades, banking instability has reached special attention particularly after the onset 
of the current United States subprimes financial crisis. Banking crises reveal the most 
important events in modern financial instability. This renewed interest is mainly due to the 
increasing occurrence of banking instability in both developed and emerging countries and its 
considerable cost. Banking crises cause a significant increase in public spending. In average, 
public debt increases 86 percent in the three years following a banking crisis. The indirect 
consequences on public finances are more important than the cost of rescue established to 
help troubled banks. [ L. Laeven , F. Valencia (2012 ), C. Reinhart and S. Rogoff (2009 ), A. 
Garcia- Herrero , P. P. del Río (2004 ) , G. Hoggarth , V. Sapporta (2002 ), Mr. Bordo et al . 
(2001) and C.J. Lindgren, G. Garcia, M. Saal (1996) ] 
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The study is motivated by the necessity to understand the determinants of banking crises in 
order to prevent them and to limit their occurrence. Our main attention to the institutional 
quality relates to an old concern in economics about the effects that financial systems may 
have on the performance of the agents within an economy. This concern has encouraged the 
development of theories and empirical research to assess the relative merits of different 
financial systems. Therefore, this paper is devoted to analyze the impact of institutional 
quality on bank instability, which constitutes the originality of our work. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the first section is devoted to a review of 
the literature on the main empirical work in this context. Next, we define the empirical 
specification and the choice of variables in the second section. The main empirical results are 
discussed in the third section. 
Section 1: Institutional quality and bank instability: A Conceptual framework  
Referring to previous empirical studies, banking crises determinants are classified into three 
categories such as macroeconomic, financial and institutional factors which correspond to the 
principal risks facing the financial intermediaries. [Claessens S. M.A. and Kose (2013) and A. 
Demirgüç -Kunt, E. Detragiache (1998)]  
General and specific shocks touching economic conditions affect the creditworthiness of 
borrowers. Thus, banks are vulnerable to the volatility of their assets and their liabilities 
value. This volatility is derived from a multitude of macroeconomic shocks which can be 
either external or domestic. High real interest rates, slowing economic growth and high 
inflation are a source of internal imbalances which can promote the occurrence of banking 
crises.  
An external source can be represented by the large fluctuations in the terms of trade. 
Therefore, banking crises were preceded by deterioration in the terms of trade with an annual 
decline of about 10% during a banking crisis compared to quiet periods. The terms of trade 
deterioration affects adversely the purchasing power, which could intensify the fragility of 
imports for a month before a crisis. 
In addition to the fragility of the macroeconomic environment, the attacks can be caused by 
weakness of the structural characteristics of banking systems. Liquidity risk is the risk of 
typical commercial banks and ―bank runs‖ is the typical model of banking crises. If bank 
deposits are not insured, a deterioration of the quality of the bank assets portfolio can trigger a 
'run' through which depositors will withdraw their funds before the bank declares bankruptcy. 
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Consequently, the bank becomes typically illiquid. Bank runs accelerate the onset of bank 
insolvency. They can be devoid of any real reason. Indeed, these runs are triggered by self-
fulfilling expectations.  
The credit expansion is a major financial cause of bank instability. The financial liberalization 
program can promote a credit expansion and a rise of asset prices. This continuous price 
increase promotes the formation of speculative bubbles. Thus, these bubbles burst can lead to 
banking and currency crises. The credit expansion following financial liberalization feeds the 
asset prices burst.  
An advanced analysis was to consider the role of the institutional framework mainly in 
banking stability because of the development of institutionalism theoretical approaches. 
Researchers were encouraged to turn to the institutional dimension as a decisive factor in 
explaining banking instability. Indeed, institutional reforms, including reforms of good 
governance, are now seen as priority development strategies. The analysis and the evaluation 
of institutions have been at the forefront of concerns in economics during the last thirty years. 
Institutions can explain the differences in terms of legal rules and their effective enforcement 
from one country to another, and their role in maintaining banking stability, financial system 
development, and therefore the growth of the entire economy. [A. Boudriga and W. 
Ghardallou (2012 ), D. Plihon (2008), W.A. Douglas (2007 ), D. Rodrik et al . (2004) , J.P. 
Jutting (2003 ), J. Aron (2000 ) , and D. Kaufmann et al . (1999) ] 
The analysis of institutional determinants of banking instability was performed mainly by A. 
Demirguc -Kunt and E. Detragiache (1998, 2005). The emergence of banking crises can be 
explained by the spread of corruption, the poor quality of law enforcement or the weaknesses 
of the legal system. These elements are negatively correlated with the effectiveness of the 
prudential supervision of the banking system. Thus, the poor quality of prudential supervision 
promotes greater opportunities for moral hazard and consequently more risks for banking 
crises. Institutional factors play an important role in explaining banking crises. 
Another factor highlighted in turn leads to increased bank instability is the presence of an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme. The study of the origin of banking instability shows the 
decisive role played by the institutional environment through the presence of deposit 
insurance. Although deposit insurance should reduce bank fragility by eliminating the 
possibility of self-fulfilling panics, it creates an excessive risk taking. Thus, a greater 
confidence in banking system ability to use external support has an important theoretical 
factor in the onset of banking crises.  
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Since banks play a key role in economic policy, a well-regulated banking sector can be seen 
as a fundamental element to the functioning of the economy. Regulatory systems are 
encouraged to develop and implement effective standards to control the behavior of banks. 
The deposit insurance is an important and potentially constructive element of maintaining 
financial security in a country. 
A study of 61 countries during the period from1980 to 1997 shows that the presence of the 
explicit deposit insurance is closely associated with a high probability of banking crises. This 
effect is more pronounced when bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional 
environment is fragile. This result is due to the fact that moral hazard is a major problem in 
liberalized financial systems where opportunities for excessive risk-taking are numerous, 
especially in countries with weak institutions. Thus, the adverse effect of the system of 
deposit insurance on bank stability is stronger where the coverage provided to depositors is 
more important (in terms of coverage ratio) and the coverage is offered by the government 
rather by the private sector (in terms of funding source) . [A. Demirguc -Kunt and E. 
Detragiache 2002] 
  Anginer D., A. Demirguc -Kunt and Zhu M. (2012 a) attempt to examine the impact of the 
structure of deposit insurance on banking sector vulnerability during the global financial 
instability. Although deposit insurance may increase moral hazard and the vulnerability of 
financial systems during the banking stability, it can also improve confidence among 
depositors and reduce the risk of contagion of bank runs during periods of banking instability 
such as the recent global financial crisis. The effect of deposit insurance on bank risk depends 
on whether the benefits of deposit insurance may outweigh their costs. A study of 4109 listed 
banks in 96 countries in the crisis period (during the crisis from 2007 to 2009 and before the 
crisis) suggests that the effect of deposit insurance on bank risk is different during periods of 
stability or instability of banks. They show that the existence of explicit deposit insurance 
promotes the probability of systemic banking crises in the pre-crisis period (from 2004 to 
2006). However, the relationship between deposit insurance and the probability of a crisis is 
reversed in the period from 2007 to 2009. Thus, deposit insurance has a stabilizing effect 
during the crisis. Nevertheless, the overall effect of deposit insurance is negative since the 
destabilizing effect in normal times is more extensive compared to the stabilizing effect 
during the period of global financial turbulence. 
The regulatory environment has an important impact on banking stability in particular and the 
performance of financial systems in general. Financial systems differ widely in terms of size, 
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structure as well as regulatory and supervision framework. The expected sign between 
regulatory quality and bank stability is positive since a regulator receiving more powers has 
the ability to detect a crisis and act to limit the adverse effects. [J . R. Barth , G. Caprio and R. 
Levine ( 2002, 2004, 2008) ] 
The analysis of the recent financial crisis reveals the crucial involvement of major financial 
innovations. These innovations may be classified to three types such as the deregulation of 
domestic financial systems, financial globalization through capital account opening and the 
emergence of new financial instruments. Therefore, the process of financial liberalization as 
an institutional financial innovation is the most prominent and this mechanism has a greater 
chance for the emergence of severe banking crises. [M. Triki et S. Maktouf (2012), A. 
Demirguc-Kunt et E. Detragiache (1999) ] 
Financial liberalization is as a determining factor in the occurrence of banking crises. A study 
of 61 countries during the period from 1975 to 1997 suggests that financial liberalization 
combined with ineffective prudential supervision in banking system will encourage excessive 
risk-taking by financial intermediaries, and consequently cause a probable crisis. [I. Noy 
(2004)] 
A study of 49 countries suggests  that countries with a strong legal environment in terms of 
rules of law and their enforcement tend to manage risks and to achieve better performance. 
Thus, the rule of law and the quality of their enforcement are important determinants of 
banking stability. [ R. La porta , F. Lopez de Silanes , A. Shleifer and R. Vishny ( 1997, 1998, 
2008)] 
A study of 121 developing countries for the period from 1966 to 2000 proposes that the 
positive effect of financial development on economic growth is weakened by the financial 
instability. It also argues that financial development must be stimulated with caution. The 
financial liberalization policies should be implemented in a strong macroeconomic 
environment and in very specific institutional conditions. The bank instability is more 
pronounced in an environment characterized by high inflation and poor rule of law. [S. 
Guillaumont and K. Kpodar ( 2006)] 
Anginer D. , A. Demirguc -Kunt and Zhu M. ( 2012 b ) have attempted to study the impact of 
bank competition on bank stability. They found a positive relationship between competition 
and systemic banking stability which supports the idea that competition encourages banks to 
take more diversified risk and makes, consequently, banking system more fragile. They also 
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examined the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment and bank competition on 
bank stability relationship. An excessive risk is more pronounced in countries characterized 
by weak banking supervision, high public ownership of banks and a restriction of competition 
by the public authority. They also found that the lack of competition has a more pronounced 
effect on the stability of the banking system in countries with a weak institutional and 
regulatory environment. 
Several studies were developed to identify the determinants of banking instability in order to 
explain their origins and to help their prevention. The current financial crisis triggered in 2007 
challenged the shortcomings of the prudential framework. It was necessary to introduce new 
mechanisms for crisis resolution to limit moral hazard. Several reforms have been 
implemented in the financial regulation area. These reforms may include changes in the 
legislation, the creation of a new structure control and the implementation of new 
international standards. [D. Perrut (2012)] 
  Section 2. Empirical specification and variables choice: 
Specifically, the following four questions are examined—and briefly answered—in this paper:  
 What are the most robust determinants of bank instability and what is their prediction 
power?  
 Do countries with more developed financial systems have a higher probability of 
suffering a banking crisis? 
 Do countries with strong institutional quality have a lower probability of suffering a 
banking crisis? 
 What is the combined impact of financial development and institutional quality impact 
on banking stability? 
2.1. Presentation of the research panel: 
        Our panel study is composed of 52 emerging countries and during the period from 1996 
to 2009. The choice of this period is due to two main reasons. It is characterized by large 
financial systems mutations and simultaneously by strong banking crises waves. The list of 
countries is reported in table 1 in the annexes. 
2.2. Variables definition: 
The list of variable is reported in Table 2 in the annexes. 
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Section 3. Results and Interpretation : 
This papers aims to identify the principal determinants of banking instability by using logit 
regression. The estimated equation is represented as follows: 
Prob ( ) = + + + + +  
Where 
 denotes the dependant variable. This dummy variable assigns the value of 1 if  there is a 
banking crisis in the country i and during the year t , and 0 else. 
 denotes financial development represented by PRIVATE CREDIT BY DEPOSIT 
MONEY BANKS / GDP and DEPOSIT MONEY BANK ASSETS / GDP ratio. 
 denotes institutional quality 
 denotes the control variable vector 
And  denotes the error term 
3.1. Institutional quality and bank instability 
This section empirically examines the interrelationships among institutional quality and bank 
instability. The proxy of institutional quality is represented by governance indicators and 
deposit insurance scheme.  
3.1.1. Governance indicators: 
Table 3.  Evidence on the relationship among institutional quality and bank instability (Private 
Credit) 
Bank instability (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
PRIVATE CREDIT 1.10*** .004*** 1.05*** .64* .73** 
 (.40) (.01) (.40) (.44) (.43) 
GROWTH -.17*** -.19 -.18*** -.19*** -.19*** 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
INITIAL GDP -.58*** -.71 -.76*** -.81*** -.88*** 
 (.17) (.16) (.18) (.18) (.21) 
GOV .002 -.02*** -.016 -.016 -.011 
 (.03) (.03) (.033) (.03) (.03) 
INF .05*** .046*** .049*** .049*** .052*** 
 (.010) (.009) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
CTE 2.48** 4.2*** 4.05*** 4.77*** 5.23*** 
 (1.09) (1.16) (1.28) (1.38) (1.63) 
PS  -.66***    
  (.19)    
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VA   -.61**   
   (.24)   
RL    -.78***  
    (.28)  
COMPOSIT INDEX     -.56** 
     (.23) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.2 0.19 
Observations 
number 615 665 612 615 612 
Rate of correct 
classification 86% 87% 86% 87% 86% 
This table reports coefficients from LOGIT regressions with standard errors in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
First, we find that the real rate of growth as well as the ratio of the initial GDP per capita GDP 
is negative and statistically significant with the ―banking crisis‖ dummy variable. Thus, low 
real economic growth is clearly associated with a high probability of banking crises, which 
confirms the idea that a decrease in the growth rate of real GDP is a major source in the 
development of banking crises during the 1980 and 1990 years. 
Inflation has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Indeed, a weak macroeconomic 
environment characterized by high inflation increases the likelihood of severe banking crises. 
Second, the growth of domestic credit coefficient is positive and statistically significant. As a 
result, all financial development indicators are positive and statistically significant. This result 
supports the hypothesis that a boom credit promotes the onset of banking crises. These results 
confirm those found by A. Demirguç -Kunt , E. Detragiache E. (2005 ) , B. Eichengreen , B. 
Arteta (2002 ), R. Glick, Hutchison (2001) and G. Mehrez , D. Kaufman ( 1999). 
Third, we found a significant negative relationship between indicators of good governance 
and the probability of banking crises. (Tables 3 and 5, columns 2, 3, 4 and 5) 
 Thus, a strong institutional environment characterized by a high degree of voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, rule of law helps reduce the 
likelihood of banking crises. [A. Demirguç -Kunt and E. Detragiache E. (2005 ) A. Boudriga 
and W. Ghardallou (2012)] 
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3.1.2 . The deposit insurance scheme: 
Table 4: Evidence on the relationship among deposit insurance scheme and bank instability 
(Private Credit) 
Dependant variable: bank 
instability (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PRIVATE CREDIT 1.25*** 1.03** 2.83*** 1.22** 
 (.4) (.43) (.90) (.53) 
GROWTH -.17*** -.17*** -.14** -.14*** 
 (.03) (.03) (.06) (.04) 
INITIAL GDP -.61*** -.62*** -1.19*** -.51** 
 (.18) (.17) (.38) (.23) 
GOV .009 .014 .13** .07* 
 (.03) (.033) (.06) (.04) 
INF .05*** .05*** .09*** .046*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) 
CTE 1.61* 2.59** 4.52** .63 
 (1.18) (1.17) (2.25) (1.58) 
DEPOSIT INS 1.12***    
 (.33)    
CO INS  1.9*   
  (1.62)   
COV   .09*  
   (.07)  
FUNDING SOURCE     .31** 
    (.4) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.15 
Observations number 615 573 162 362 
Rate of correct classification 86% 86% 78% 83% 
This table reports coefficients from LOGIT regressions with standard errors in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent  and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
Many economists argue that the probability of occurrence of banking crises depends on the 
nature of the structural quality of supervision and regulation. They argue that deposit 
insurance increases the risk of outbreak of banking crises due to the reduction in market 
discipline and incentives for excessive risk taking. [A. Demirguc -Kunt and E. Detragiache 
(2002, 2005)] . Others insist that the deposit insurance plays a stabilizing role in eliminating 
the problem of depositors panic that dominates any negative effect on market discipline. [R. 
Gropp and J.M. Vesala (2004)].  
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Recent studies suggest that the impact of deposit insurance on banking stability differs 
according to the sample of countries selected (developing or developed countries) and the 
period selected (crisis period or stability period)  
To deal with these ambiguous findings in previous studies, we try to test this aspect 
empirically. 
We find that the deposits insurance dummy is positive and statistically significant. (columns 1 
Tables 4 and 6). Moreover, the presence of explicit deposit insurance appears to be a probable 
risk factor since the positive effect in terms of banking stability in reducing trigger self-
fulfilling panics is offset by the negative effect through the emergence of the phenomenon of 
moral hazard. [ Demirguç - Kunt, A. , E. Detragiache (2002 , 2005) and JR Barth , G. Caprio 
and R. Levine ( 2002, 2004, 2008) ] 
 To better understand the relationship between ―deposit insurance‖ and banking instability, we 
will draw a distinction between the nature of the different insurance systems on deposits such 
as the degree of coverage and funding sources.  Results are reported in tables 4 et 6. 
Table 5. Evidence on the relationship among institutional quality and bank instability ( 
ASSET/GDP) 
Dependant variable: bank 
instability (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ACTIF/PIB .82** .80*** .73* .36 .49 
  (.37) (.36) (.38) (.41) (.39) 
GROWTH -.18*** -.18*** -.19*** -.2*** -.19*** 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
INITIAL GDP -.55*** -.74*** -.78*** -.79*** -.88*** 
  (.16) (.18) (.18) (.18) (.21) 
GOV -.003 -.02 -.014 -.02 -.016 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
INF .05*** .049*** .05*** .05*** .052*** 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
CTE 2.33** 4** 4.48*** 4.84*** 5.38*** 
  (1.09) (1.27) (1.27) (1.37) (1.62) 
VA   -.64*       
    (.24)       
PS     -.67***     
      (.19)     
RL       -.85**   
        (.28)   
COMPOSIT INDEX         -.61* 
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          (.23) 
Observations number  
616 613 616 616 613 
          
Pseudo R
2
 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.19 
Rate of correct classification 86.20% 86.30% 86.69% 86.53% 86.30% 
This table reports coefficients from LOGIT regressions with standard errors in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent  and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
Table 6. Evidence on the relationship among deposit insurance scheme and bank instability( 
ASSET/GDP) 
Dependant variable: bank 
instability (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ACTIF/PIB .89** .67* 1.96** .83* 
 (.36) (.39) (.74) (.47) 
GROWTH -.17*** -.18*** -.12* -.14*** 
 (.03) (.03) (.06) (.04) 
INITIAL GDP -.56*** -.57*** -1.06** -.46** 
 (.17) (.17) (.37) (.23) 
GOV .002 .008 .12** .06 
 (.03) (.03) (.05) (.04) 
INF .05*** .05*** .09*** .05*** 
 (.01) (.009) (.02) (.01) 
CTE 1.44 2.38** 3.79* .473 
 (1.17) (1.15) (2.18) (1.58) 
 DEPOSIT INS 1.08***    
 (.33)    
CO INS  1.89*   
  (1.61)   
COV   .09*  
   (.06)  
FUNDING SOURCE     .24* 
    (.39) 
Observations number 
Pseudo R
2
 
Rate of correct classification 
616 574 163 363 
0.21 0.18 0.19 0.15 
86% 86% 78% 84% 
This table reports coefficients from LOGIT regressions with standard errors in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent  and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
Empirical evidence shows that the dummy variables coverage has positive and significant 
coefficients (Columns 3 Tables 4 and 6). While the extent of the coverage seems to be the 
best guarantee against the runs on deposits, it promotes intense incentives for excessive risk-
taking by banks. These results suggest that explicit deposit insurance tends to aggravate the 
banking fragility as more intense coverage. The strong correlation between the variables of 
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the degree of coverage and banking instability tends to support the idea that the negative 
aspects of deposit insurance systems can be limited by reducing the extended coverage. 
The  ―source of funding‖ dummy is positive and statistically significant with the likelihood of 
systemic banking crises ( Columns 4 Tables 4 and 6) , which confirms the idea that the moral 
hazard problem is more pronounced if the insurance funds are provided by the government 
and if insurance funds are provided by banks. These results support the idea that the negative 
impact of deposit insurance can be reduced by limiting the scope of coverage.  
3.2 . Evidence on the relationship among interaction term between financial development and 
institutional development and banking instability 
Theory reviewed in Section I suggests that the adverse effect of financial development on 
banking fragility is stronger where the institutions needed for the correct functioning of 
financial systems are not well established. To test whether this effect is supported by the data, 
we add to baseline regressions in Table 7 various variables in the form of interaction terms 
between financial development and institutional quality. 
Negative and significant coefficients for the interaction variables mean that a better 
institutional quality tends to weaken the effect of financial development on banking fragility. 
These results suggest that improving the institutional quality, especially reducing the amount 
of corruption and strengthening the rule of law, can curb the tendency of financial 
development to harbor banking crises. This confirms the idea that a successful financial 
development policy must be implemented in a sound institutional environment characterized 
by a high degree of political stability and voice and citizenship. Strengthening the institutional 
quality  tends to reduce the probability of a bank crisis. Thus, the negative impact of financial 
development on banking stability is more pronounced if institutions, which are necessary for 
the smooth functioning of financial systems, are not well established. These results confirm 
those found by S. Guillaumont , K. Kpodar (2006) and E. Detragiache , T. Tressel (2008). 
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Table 7. Evidence on the relationship among institutional quality, financial development and 
bank instability 
Dependant variable: bank instability (1) (2) 
GROWTH -.16*** -.17*** 
 (.03) (.03) 
INITIAL GDP -.78*** -.77*** 
 (.2) (.2) 
GOV -.02 -.03 
 (.03) (.03) 
INF .77*** .77*** 
 (.15) (.15) 
CTE 2.87* 2.95** 
 (1.47) (1.48) 
IQ* PRIVATE CREDIT -1.27***  
 (.36)  
 IQ* ASSET/GDP  -1.08*** 
  (.30) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2 0.2 
Observations number 536 536 
Rate of correct classification 87% 86% 
This table reports coefficients from LOGIT regressions with standard errors in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
Since adverse effect of financial development on banking fragility widely depends on 
macroeconomic stability, we add to baseline regressions in Table 8 various variables in the 
form of interaction terms between financial development and inflation. 
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Table 8: Evidence on the relationship among deposit insurance scheme, macroeconomic 
environment and bank instability 
Dependant variable: bank 
instability (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GROWTH -.18*** -.2*** -.18*** -.20*** 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.028) 
INITIAL GDP -.52*** -.56*** -.57*** -.602*** 
  (.13) (.13) (.14) (.14) 
GOV -.01 -.013 .005 -.011 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
CTE 2.63* 3.3*** 2.72*** 3.45*** 
  (.95) (.93) (.97) (.94) 
PRIVATE CREDIT *INF .001***     
  (.0003)    
PRIVATE CREDIT 
*DEPOSIT INS  .01**   
   (.002)   
ASSET/GDP *INF   .15***   
   (.03)   
ASSET/GDP *DEPOSIT 
INS     .96*** 
     (.28) 
Observations number  706 706 706 706 
Pseudo R
2
 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.15 
Rate of correct 
classification 86% 86% 86% 86% 
This table reports coefficients from LOGIT regressions with standard errors in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent  and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
When the multiplicative specification is tested ( columns 1 and 3 Table 8 ), the impact of 
financial development on banking instability appears as an increasing function of the inflation 
rate. An unstable macroeconomic environment or inappropriate economic policy favor the 
likelihood that the financial system is dotted with financial crises. 
Another very important issue is raised as to whether the deposit insurance affects the impact 
of financial development on banking stability. To test this hypothesis, we use an interaction 
term between financial development and deposit insurance dummy (columns 2 and 4, Table 
8). This interaction term is strongly and positively correlated with the likelihood of banking 
instability. The effect of financial development on banking instability grows along with the 
presence of explicit deposit insurance. As a result, the deposit insurance tends to increase 
banking instability in a more developed financial system. [ A. Demirguc -Kunt, B. 
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Karacaovali, Laeven L. (2005 ), A. Demirguc -Kunt , H. Huizinga (2004 ), A. Demirguc -
Kunt , E. Detragiache E. (2002) and A. Demirguc -Kunt , E. Kane (2002). 
Finally, we examine the impact of financial liberalization on banking instability. The results 
are presented in Table 9. 
We find a significant and a positive relationship between financial liberalization and banking 
instability. The financial liberalization dummy is positive and statistically significant with the 
risk of emergence of banking crises. Financial liberalization is an important factor for banking 
sector fragility. [A. Demirguç -Kunt , E. Detragiache (1999) , B. Eichengreen , B. Arteta 
(2002 ), I. Noy (2004) and E. Detragiache , T. Tressel (2008) M. Triki et S. Maktouf 
(2012)].(Table 9, column 1) 
To better understand the impact of financial liberalization on banking instability, we add to 
baseline regressions in Table 9 various variables in the form of interaction terms between 
financial liberalization and institutional quality. Empirical evidence shows that the interaction 
term is significantly and negatively correlated with the probability of banking crises (column 
3 Table 9). This confirms the idea that a successful financial liberalization policy must be 
implemented in a sound institutional environment characterized by a high degree of political 
stability, a low level of corruption and high quality law enforcement. Strengthening the 
quality of the institutional environment by reducing the level of corruption, for example, tends 
to reduce the probability of bank instability and keep the degree of bank stability. Thus, the 
negative impact of financial liberalization on banking stability is more pronounced if 
necessary for the smooth functioning of financial markets institutions are not well established. 
Moreover, the adverse impact of financial liberalization on banking stability can be moderated 
by strengthening the structures of supervision and prudential regulation. [E. Detragiache , T. 
Tressel (2008) and B. Eichengreen , C. Arteta (2002)]. 
Another very important issue is observed whether financial liberalization affects the impact of 
deposit insurance on bank stability. To test this hypothesis, we use an interaction term 
between the variable of financial liberalization and deposit insurance. This interaction term 
has positive and statistically significant coefficients (column 2 Table 9). As a result, the 
deposit insurance tends to increase banking instability in liberalized financial systems. 
According to the theoretical literature, bank interest control under financial repression limits 
the ability of banks to benefit from high-risk projects with higher returns and moderates the 
effect of moral hazard induced by the deposit insurance systems. The problem of moral 
hazard encouraged by the presence of deposit insurance may be more pronounced when 
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banking systems are liberalized. These results confirm those found by A. Demirguc -Kunt , B. 
Karacaovali , Laeven L. (2005 ), A. Demirguc -Kunt , H. Huizinga (2004 ), A. Demirguc -
Kunt , E. Detragiache E. (2002) and A. Demirguc -Kunt , E. Kane (2001) and B. Eichengreen, 
C. Arteta (2002). 
Finally, to test the relationship between deposit insurance and banking stability, we introduce 
institutional quality effect. Deposit insurance effect can be moderated by effective prudential 
regulation and supervision. The interaction term between the quality of institutions and 
deposits insurance is negative and statically significant which supports that moral hazard and 
the erosion of market discipline should be more pronounced when institutions are poorly 
established. [ Eichengreen , Arteta (2002) and A. Demirguc -Kunt and E. Detragiache (2002 ) 
hypothesis. (Table 9, column 4)] 
Table 9 : Evidence on the relationship among deposit insurance scheme, financial 
liberalization, institutional quality and bank instability 
Dependant variable: bank instability (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PRIVATE CREDIT .01*** .01*** .008*** .008* 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
GROWTH -.2*** -.16*** -.17*** -.18*** 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
INITIAL GDP -.1 -.46** -.66*** -.72*** 
 (.18) (.16) (.19) (.18) 
GOV -.02 -.03 -.04 -.08** 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
INF .71*** .77*** .82*** .86*** 
 (.16) (.15) (.16) (.16) 
CTE .45 -.08 1.92 2.82* 
 (1.24) (1.26) (1.52) (1.49) 
FL .19***    
 (.04)    
FL*DEPOSIT INS  .01*   
  (.018)   
FL*IQ   -.03**  
   (.013)  
DEPOSIT INS*IQ    -.99*** 
    (.25) 
Observations number 536 536 536 536 
Pseudo R
2 0.23 0.2 0.2 0.22 
Rate of correct classification 86% 85% 85 85 
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This table reports coefficients from LOGIT regressions with standard errors in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent  and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
Conclusion 
The banking crisis multiplication raises debate on bank stability which has become a primary 
concern for financial authorities. Several empirical studies have been conducted to prevent 
banking crises and to limit their occurrence. These studies lead to a variety of variables 
explaining banking sector instability by underlying institutional environment characteristics. 
The question of the impact of institutional quality on banking instability is at the heart of 
theoretical debates. However, this issue has rarely developed in the empirical literature. In this 
context, we propose paying more attention to the characteristic of institutional environment. 
To do this, we conducted an empirical study of 52 emerging and / or developing during the 
period between 1996 and 2009 and through using a battery of macroeconomic, financial and 
institutional variables. The main results relative to the sample of countries studied and the 
selected period can be summarized as follows: 
First, institutional factors are the main factors that have weakened the banking system and 
triggered the crisis. The favorable impact of the strengthening of institutional quality on bank 
stability is necessary. In addition, the presence of explicit deposit insurance appears to be a 
relevant determinant of banking instability in emerging and/ or developing countries, since 
probably positive (in terms of bank stability) in reducing trigger self-fulfilling panics is offset 
by negative effect induced by the effect of moral hazard. 
Second, banking instability is more sensitive to credit growth. Thus,  credit expansion plays a 
key role in the emergence of financial fragility. The sharp increase in the volume of bank 
credit would strengthen the financial instability. 
Third, the impact of financial development on banking instability appears to be an increasing 
function of the inflation rate. Macroeconomic instability promotes more credit expansion and 
consequently, financial fragility. 
Similarly, the impact of financial development on banking instability could increase when the 
institutional environment is weak especially characterized by political instability, high 
corruption amount and low level of the rule of laws.  
In addition, the deposit insurance tends to increase banking instability in a more developed 
financial system. 
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Besides institutional factors, macroeconomic factors combined with credit expansion can 
precipitate a banking crisis and they are the most cycle characteristic such as growth, real 
interest rate and inflation rates. 
Our results suggest that it would be desirable to implement institutional reforms by 
strengthening supervision and prudential regulation structures and promote more banking 
stability. Indeed, countries with a weak institutional environment are most threatened by the 
risk of occurrence of banking instability. 
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Annexes: 
Table 1: Emerging and/ or developing countries list: 
Asia Latin America Emerging Europe Middle East & 
Africa 
Bangladesh* 
 
Argentina* Bulgaria Algeria 
China* 
 
Bolivia Croatia 
 
Egypt* 
Czech rep Brasil* Cyprus Émirats arabes 
unis* 
Hong Kong Chile* Hongria* Israël 
India* Colombia 
 
Latvia Kuwait 
Indonesia* 
 
Ecuador Lituani 
a 
Lebanon 
Laos Mexico* Polond* Maroco 
South Korea* Nicaragua Roumania South Africa* 
Malasia* Panama Russia* Qatar 
Philippines* Paraguay Slovenia Tunisia 
 
Singapor 
 
Peru Slovac Turkey* 
Sri Lanka 
 
Uruguay Ukraine* Yemen 
Thaïland* 
 
Venezuela   
Taiwan, china 
 
   
Vietnam*   
 
 
* Denotes an emerging country by the International Monetary Fund in 2012 
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Table 2: variable list: 
Variables 
  
      Indicateurs retenus       Sources 
Macroéconomic 
Variables 
 Initial  GDP: GDP per capita (constant 2005 
US$)  
 
 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 Economic growth : (Growth), GDP per capita 
growth (annual %)  
 Inflation: inf : Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %) 
 GOV: General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
financial Variables
:  
 
 PRIVATE CREDIT BY DEPOSIT MONEY 
BANKS / GDP (PRIVATE CREDIT) 
 DEPOSIT MONEY BANK ASSETS / 
GDP(ASSET/GDP) 
Global 
Financial 
Development 
database 
institutionnal 
Variables : IQ 
Indicateurs de gouvernance : 
 Voice and Accountability  (VA): 
 Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism (PS):  
 Government Effectiveness (GE)  
 Regulatory Quality (RQ)  
 Rule of Law (RL) 
 Control of Corruption (Corr) 
 
The Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
Deposit insurance : 
 Dummy variable for the presence of an 
emplicit deposit insurance scheme 
(DEPOSIT INS) 
 
 
 
 25 
 
 The “coinsurance” dummy assigns the value 
of 0 if  Deposit insurance is implicit, the 
value of 1 if  Deposit insurance is explicit 
and there  no coinsurance and the value of  
21 if  Deposit insurance is explicit and there  
coinsurance (CO INS)  
 The dummy variable assigns the value of 0 if  
Deposit insurance is implicit, the value of 1 if  
Deposit insurance is explicit and there  is no 
foreign currency deposits coinsurance and 
the value of  2 if  Deposit insurance is 
explicit and there  is foreign currency 
deposits (COV) 
 The dummy variable source of funding 
source is whether the resources are provided 
by the banks themselves, by the government, 
or by both (Funding source) 
 
Bank 
Regulation and 
Supervision 
Database 
update 2012 
  
Financial liberalization : FL 
 The “FL” dummy assigns the value of 0 if  
financial system is totally repressed, the 
value of 1 if it is partially liberalized and the 
value of2 if it is fully liberalized.  
A. Abiad, E. 
Detragiache & 
T. Tressel 
(2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
